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CUSLI EXPERT ROUNDTABLE REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND NORTH
AMERICAN INFRASTRUCTURE
1

The following is a report of the Canada-United States Law Institute’s October 2015
Experts’ Meeting held in Washington, D.C. The Meeting focused on the current state and
future of North American infrastructure development and current international trade
topics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 29, 2015, the Canada-United States Law Institute (CUSLI) 2
hosted an expert panel discussion at the Steptoe & Johnson PLLC’s Washington,
D.C. offices. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss infrastructure
development as a driver of economic growth and current developments in
Canada-United States trade issues. Expert participants sought to identify
distinctions between Canadian and U.S. infrastructure development policies and
practices as well as discuss the future of current trade topics and their immediate
impact on North American economic interests.
The meeting featured distinguished experts from both the public and private
spheres in Canada and the United States. The meeting was broken into two
expert panel discussions: one focused on approaches to infrastructure
development, while the other concentrated on the changing political dynamics of
1 This report was prepared by Chloe O’Kelly, Richard Wanerman, and Stephanie
Amoako. Ms. O’Kelly is a Program Associate with the Public International Law & Policy
Group (“PILPG”). Mr. Wanerman and Ms. Amoako are Law Fellows with PILPG. Tiffany
Mathiason, Law Fellow with PILPG, provided editing assistance.
2 CUSLI is a non-profit organization with the goal of establishing professional and
institutional links between the legal communities in Canada and the United States. CUSLI also
provides resources to members on the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United
States, and helps to facilitate comparative law education and research opportunities for
students and faculty at member organizations within Canada and the United States.
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the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”). During the first panel, experts discussed
the value of public-private partnerships in promoting economic development. In
the second panel, meeting participants focused on Canadian and American
attitudes toward the TPP, as well as how recent political developments would
impact the ratification of the partnership between Canada, the United States, and
states along the Pacific Rim.
Several important themes emerged from the expert panel discussions.
Regarding infrastructure and development, participants first highlighted the
successful implementation of public-private partnerships (“P3”) in Canada.
Secondly, participants described the challenges to P3 in the United States, while
examining how transportation agencies have engaged in these ventures. Lastly,
participants discussed the future of P3 in the two countries.
Concerning trade issues, the discussion focused mainly on TPP. First,
participants discussed recent political developments in Canada and the United
States that may affect the ratification of TPP. Second, participants provided an
overview of the creation of TPP and its relationship to the larger global trade
environment. Third, participants described the stages of the ratification process
and speculated about challenges at each stage. Finally, the participants turned to
how TPP might affect the Canada-United States relationship.

II. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES IN CANADA
The first expert panel focused on innovative approaches to infrastructure
development opportunities in Canada and the United States, namely publicprivate partnerships (“P3s”). Participants first analyzed the evolution of
infrastructure development practices in Canada. Participants posited that until
approximately twenty years ago, Canada relied on traditional practices of
infrastructure funding. These traditional practices required government funding
at or near the full cost of the infrastructure project through a combination of
direct expenditures, bond or debt issuances, or tolls and fees. However, there
were many risks associated with this traditional approach; for instance, revenue
authorities were not always able to guarantee the full level of revenue over the
life of project payments.
As a result, over the past twenty years, Canada has encouraged partnerships
between the public and private sectors to build and maintain infrastructure
projects. These P3s allow the government to shift immediate financial
responsibility to construction corporations under a long-term financing plan with
either the federal government or provincial governments. Corporations, in turn,
finance infrastructure development projects through direct expenditures, bank
loans, bonds, and guarantees of future payments. P3s allow for greater flexibility
in long-term financing, as the government and corporations can work together to
establish a payment system moving forward. Furthermore, corporations can
provide a range of services on infrastructure development projects, from initial
design and construction to maintenance and operation of the finished project.
The government and corporations can also establish cost- and revenue-sharing
plans under the P3 structure. By separating the initial funding of infrastructure
development projects from later payments, governments can ensure a more

142

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40, 2016]

efficient schedule of infrastructure delivery. The P3 structure can even help to
depoliticize infrastructure projects, as private corporations share a stake in the
success of infrastructure development.
Investment in infrastructure development is a top priority across all levels of
government in Canada. In response to a devastating infrastructure deficit, the
government of Ontario committed to a long-term P3 infrastructure plan in 20032004 by creating a specialized technical agency, Infrastructure Ontario (“IO”).
IO operates under five guiding values, which have come to inform Canadian P3
processes today: (1) public interest in infrastructure projects is paramount; (2)
value for money invested in infrastructure development is demonstrable; (3)
appropriate public ownership must be preserved; (4) accountability for
infrastructure projects must be maintained; and (5) all P3 processes must be fair,
transparent, and efficient. Today, Canada is perceived as the epicenter of P3
infrastructure projects. Current P3 infrastructure projects in Canada take into
consideration increasing urbanization, deterioration of infrastructure, and
environmental sustainability. Canada has completed 238 successful P3 projects
thus far, at a value of over seventy billion Canadian dollars. Forty jurisdictions
from around the world have consulted IO, and 100 P3 projects are currently in
the pipeline for Ontario alone. Additionally, IO has strengthened partnerships
with various U.S. federal departments to initiate and develop P3 programs across
the Canada-United States border.

III. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES IN THE U.S.
Participants next turned to analyze the current status of P3 infrastructure
development projects in the United States. Participants argued that P3 projects
have not achieved the same level of success in the United States as they have in
Canada for a variety of reasons. In some states and municipalities, U.S. officials
cannot appropriate funds for projects beyond term limits, which affects the
timeline and support of P3 infrastructure projects. Furthermore, in some U.S.
states, local contractors, local engineering companies, unions, and other vested
interests lobby against P3 efforts in infrastructure development, fearing further
government regulations. A number of high-profile P3 infrastructure projects in
the United States to date have been considered failures, such as the Chicago
Skyway project, which further deters public officials from undertaking new P3
projects. Despite these obstacles to P3 infrastructure project development in the
United States, participants maintained that the United States has the potential to
be the largest P3 market in the world.
Successful P3 infrastructure projects in the United States have largely been
credited to departments of transportation or other governmental agencies with
transportation responsibility. P3 infrastructure development projects related to
transportation are more attractive in the United States because they tend to be
large-scale projects with high revenue, which provide greater equity interests for
private partners. Furthermore, transportation agencies have a large inventory of
projects, with work backlog worth billions of dollars. The sheer volume of
transportation projects creates opportunities to engage in P3 initiatives. In
addition, the U.S. Department of Transportation enacted the Transportation
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Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, a loan program to create incentives,
including longer-term loans, for state and local governments to get involved in
P3s. Though state departments of transportation across the United States have
retained a strong institutional knowledge of infrastructure development, other
public agencies in the United States lack a comprehensive understanding of P3
processes, further hampering their expansion into fields such as school and
public building construction.

IV. P3S AND THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT
During the experts’ meeting, participants agreed on guidelines and best
practices for P3 infrastructure projects in both Canada and the United States.
Since P3 infrastructure projects tend to span many electoral cycles and levels of
funding, participants stressed that over-arching political vision and support is
essential to the success of these projects. In order to further depoliticize P3
projects, participants argued that when possible, the government should be
separated from the agency working on the procurement process. In addition,
procurement structures need to be predictable, reliable, and most importantly
transparent. Furthermore, participants agreed that educating citizens on P3
structure and processes is essential to building support for P3 infrastructure
development. Finally, it is vital for governments to ensure that proper parameters
and safeguards are in place with P3 projects like internal and external oversight
mechanisms. With such mechanisms established, P3 projects will be able to
operate effectively across international borders, specifically strengthening
bilateral approaches to infrastructure development between Canada and the
United States.

V. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
The second panel of the Experts’ Meeting concerned recent developments in
bilateral trade issues and the multi-lateral Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”). The
TPP occupied the majority of the discussion, and at the time of the Meeting, two
events with implications for the future of TPP had recently occurred. So the
participants strove to balance their views in light of the changing context of the
bilateral trade environment. The first development was that the state parties to
the TPP had only just approved the working language of the document, and their
negotiators had not yet released all the details of the final agreement. However,
much of the agreement was disseminated through the press and trade experts,
permitting participants to discuss some of the technical details. The second was
that Canada just held a general election for Parliament, and the Liberal Party
under Justin Trudeau won a majority of seats after nine years of Conservative
governments under Stephen Harper. As Trudeau’s government had not yet been
sworn in, some participants gave their opinions and predictions about Prime
Minister Trudeau’s attitude toward TPP under a caveat of calculated speculation.
In addition, the Obama administration’s decision to reject the Keystone XL
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pipeline had not yet been announced, but was considered at the time to be the
likely outcome.
The panel addressed the background of TPP in the context of global trade.
The panelists generally agreed that TPP will likely be the model of world trade
agreements in the future, and that TPP is the test case for whether a
comprehensive, multilateral world trade regime can work. They discussed that
TPP was born out of the collapse of the Doha Development Round of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), which they believed failed because of a
fundamental disagreement about the privileges and responsibilities of developed
and developing states. The Pacific Rim states wanted to continue pursuing a
comprehensive multilateral agreement, leading to TPP. Trade today, the panel
determined, is no longer only about the international movement and taxation of
goods, but also concerns foreign direct investment and the establishment of
foreign subsidiaries of international corporations. Furthermore, parties consider
the economic, taxation, and employment implications of greater openness to such
activities. In light of this, some on the panel expressed concerns that the
expanded scope of coverage of trade agreements may lead to a ‘balkanization’ of
world trade. Additionally, participants questioned whether this expanded scope
would lead to a fundamental undermining of the WTO, as differing regional
agreements produce different standards for such issues as foreign direct
investment and intellectual property protections, potentially leading to global
wealth imbalances. As for the Doha Development Round, some participants
expressed the opinion that it is functionally dead.
The panel agreed that, while the success of Pacific Rim trade negotiators in
achieving a draft agreement was substantial, it is only part of the first act of a
metaphorical five-act drama for this treaty. Act I includes both the draft language
of the treaty and the actual legal language for negotiating states to consider. Act
II will be when TPP states actually sign the agreement, which they noted has the
potential to be highly political. Both the public and private sectors will look to
whether President Obama signs the agreement. Under a prior arrangement with
Congress, he is required to give Congress 90-days’ notice before he signs the
agreement, and some on the panel believe that opponents of TPP in Congress
may try to use legislative maneuvering to stall President Obama’s signature.
Prime Minister Trudeau is expected to withhold his signature until he knows if
President Obama will sign TPP. If President Obama does not, then the panel
agreed that not only would Trudeau not sign, but the strength of the agreement
would be severely reduced due to the absence of two of the largest TPP
economies. Some panelists were of the opinion that TPP might itself fail if
neither Canada nor the United States signed. Although signing an agreement
does not bind a state to the terms of the agreement, it signals an intention to be
bound, which may be too controversial for some politicians.
Act III will be the ratification process, likely to occur in the summer of 2016,
which will also probably feature an Obama-Trudeau coordination. President
Obama will need to present implementing legislation to Congress for
consideration and approval, but if the implementing legislation as passed does
not comport with TPP, then TPP’s future is uncertain. One member of the panel
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noted that Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah has already stated his intention to alter
the language of the implementing legislation as compared to whatever final TPP
text upon which the Senate will vote. Complicating any ratification vote in the
United States is the existence of side letters between United States and Japanese
negotiators. Experts know the two states exchanged letters of mutual agreement
concerning elements of TPP, but the contents remain unknown. Members of
Congress have already demanded to know the substance of the side agreements
before voting on TPP, which may further delay any ratification of the agreement.
Prime Minister Trudeau will likely wait to propose the treaty for ratification in
Parliament until he knows that it will be ratified in Congress. While Congress
debates TPP, however, Trudeau has already stated his intent to give
parliamentary committees more power to review TPP prior to any ratification
vote, which some panelists noted is a significant break from traditional
parliamentary practice.
Acts IV and V depend on ratification, and concern implementation and entry
into force, respectively. Although the United States will use an implementing
legislation approach to ratification of TPP, the concern expressed by the panel
regards how agencies in TPP states will begin implementing its provisions,
especially its investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Many opponents to
TPP, especially in the United States, have noted with concern the potential for
investor-state disputes to be settled in jurisdictions with few legal protections and
known biases against foreign investors. Under the terms of TPP, most judicial
decisions by TPP states on cases under its jurisdiction must be enforced in all
TPP states. Some members of the panel disagreed with this concern about
dispute settlement procedures in other states, believing that pressure and image
concerns will ensure reliable judicial processes no matter where they are held.
The final stage will be whether all TPP states implement and enforce TPP
uniformly, and whether any effort at true uniformity will entice more states to
join TPP. The panel opined that it is too early to speculate on that.

VI. BILATERAL ISSUES CONCERNING TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AND
BEYOND
As between the United States and Canada in particular, the panel noted
certain key areas in which bilateral relations may be affected by TPP. These
areas may still need to be resolved on a bilateral basis. First, the panel generally
agreed that the election of Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister will improve
bilateral relations, which had soured in recent years over such issues as the
Keystone XL pipeline. While they noted Trudeau’s support for Keystone, they
also noted that he was not likely to let a possible rejection of the application
before the State Department negatively impact his relationship with President
Obama. In addition, the panel agreed that Trudeau’s campaign pledge to end
Canadian airstrikes in Syria would be a disappointment to Washington, but that
as with Keystone, it would not significantly harm bilateral relations. Second, the
panel significantly noted that the softwood lumber agreement was about to
expire. While this is not generally a central issue in the United States, it is a
major issue for Canadian business, as softwood lumber exports are worth
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approximately six billion Canadian dollars annually. While this is one of the
largest sources of bilateral friction, the panel generally agreed that both Canada
and the United States would likely come to an amicable solution to the problem,
as the soon-to-expire agreement seemed to work well.
After considering TPP in general, the panel addressed the more intricate
legal and diplomatic concerns surrounding Canada-United States relations that
may change as a result of TPP. On the question of individual laws, the panel
agreed that U.S. law will likely not change much, and that any changes would be
technical and narrow, only altering the current language of U.S. trade laws to
comply with TPP. Canada may need to perform more substantive changes to its
laws regarding supply-side management of commodities under Crown
corporations, such as dairy and wheat, but these will also likely be limited. The
panel also generally agreed that pre-existing North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”) arrangements will not be hindered by TPP, with some
participants believing that NAFTA actually may come out stronger as a result of
TPP. As for new country of origin labeling laws, the United States, Canada, and
Mexico will have their disagreements regarding the actual terms of the laws, but
the panel believed it likely that the three states will address the dispute privately.

VII. CONCLUSION
The CUSLI experts’ meeting touched on a number of themes related to
approaches to infrastructure development as a driver of economic growth, in
addition to hot-button trade topics such as the TPP. Participants began by
describing the different trajectories that P3 has taken regarding infrastructure
development in Canada and the United States. Next, participants discussed the
future of P3 in the two countries. During the second panel, the participants
focused on TPP and its implementation. First, participants discussed recent
political developments that may affect ratification. Second, participants
described how TPP developed in the context of a failed WTO Doha round. Third,
participants set a roadmap of the ratification of TPP and anticipated challenges to
ratification. Finally, participants discussed how TPP might affect Canada-United
States relations.

